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Introduction
Deborah Lucas
Following the collapse of US housing prices and the ﬁ  nancial turmoil that 
followed, the federal government is on course to intervene in ﬁ  nancial mar-
kets to an extent unparalleled in US history. A partial tally includes a $29 
billion, no recourse loan from the Fed to rescue Bear Stearns and its sub-
sequent interventions to restore liquidity to the money markets; the federal 
takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and their exposure to the credit 
risk on $5 trillion of residential mortgages; loans in excess of $100 billion 
to insurance giant AIG; and the passage of legislation granting open- ended 
authority for the Treasury to purchase up to $700 billion in troubled assets 
from ﬁ  nancial institutions.
Long before these extraordinary events unfolded, the US Federal Gov-
ernment already functioned as the world’s largest ﬁ  nancial institution. Its 
central role in credit and insurance markets manifests itself through such 
diverse activities as: guaranteeing loans for housing, agriculture, education, 
small businesses, and trade; making direct loans for education, housing, 
and rural utilities; insuring bank deposits, deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pension plans, 
crops, and real property; providing pension beneﬁ  ts to federal civilian and 
military employees; promising Social Security and other contingent social 
insurance payments; implicitly or explicitly guaranteeing the obligations 
of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) like the Federal Home Loan 
Banks and the farm credit system; and acting as a steward for environmental 
assets and liabilities.
A prerequisite for eﬀective ﬁ  nancial management—and for meaningful 
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public oversight—is accurate metrics for assessing costs, beneﬁ  ts, and risks. 
This is the logic behind the increasingly stringent rules governing ﬁ  nancial 
reporting for corporations and the trend toward requiring publicly traded 
ﬁ  rms to provide fair value estimates for their ﬁ  nancial securities. Having 
reliable measures is arguably even more important in the public sector, where 
costs and risks that are not oﬃcially accounted for can be largely invisible 
to policymakers and to the public, or at least ignored more easily, leading to 
the overprovision of activities whose costs are underestimated in the budget 
process and other oﬃcial estimates.
Despite the size and importance of federal involvement in ﬁ  nancial mar-
kets, the costs and risks of most federal ﬁ  nancial activities are only par-
tially measured and are poorly understood. In important respects (e.g., the 
absence of capital budgets, risk adjustment, and sophisticated internal cost-
ing systems), federal accounting for ﬁ  nancial risk and value lags well behind 
private-  sector standards. The political process provides few incentives for 
improving disclosures, even when a ﬁ  nancial crisis spurs calls for reform. 
Also, with a few notable exceptions, academics have devoted relatively little 
attention to improving the measurements of federal ﬁ  nancial costs and risks. 
Programmatic complexity and the diﬃculty of obtaining data from federal 
agencies create substantial barriers to entry for researchers, and the topic 
has remained outside of the mainstream of economic inquiry.
The purpose of this volume is to begin ﬁ  lling these gaps. The chapters 
and discussions highlight how the rules of federal budgeting obscure the 
economic cost of federal ﬁ  nancial obligations. They also provide more com-
prehensive estimates of the costs and beneﬁ  ts of a wide variety of federal 
ﬁ  nancial activities and develop new methodologies to improve such mea-
surements. The analyses encompass a broad spectrum of federal programs—
housing and government sponsored enterprises, catastrophe insurance, 
student loans, Social Security, and environmental liabilities. Although not 
inclusive of the full scope of federal ﬁ  nancial obligations, collectively, these 
studies demonstrate how the logic of ﬁ  nancial economics can be informa-
tive about a broad range of federal activities and the potential for academic 
research to better inform public discourse on these issues.
A fundamental theme running through this volume is that market prices, 
or “fair value” estimates, are the best measure of the opportunity cost to 
society of government expenditures and that federal obligations should 
therefore be evaluated using them. Most economists accept the premise that 
using market prices (as opposed to “administrative” or “historical book” 
prices) is the best approach, but there is still resistance to this idea in some 
parts of the federal budgeting community and among many actuaries. In 
fact, some budget practitioners may view nonmarket estimates as natural, 
because federal law stipulates that credit obligations be budgeted for using 
risk-  free rates for discounting. Whether this rule should be modiﬁ  ed and 
what the eﬀects would be are critical issues that are addressed by some of Introduction    3
the chapters in this volume. More broadly, an aim of this book is to clearly 
present the case for market prices in a way that is accessible to an audience 
of both economists and noneconomists.
In the wake of the ﬁ  nancial crisis and the criticisms that arose about 
fair value accounting for private ﬁ  nancial institutions in distressed markets, 
some readers may be skeptical about the wisdom of introducing similar 
rules into federal accounting. Yet, these events have not invalidated the 
principles that are the foundations for the view that market prices are the 
best available measure of value. The practical resiliency of this idea and the 
absence of a more compelling alternative is demonstrated by several recent 
developments in private-  sector and public-  sector accounting regulation: 
the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) continues to support fair 
value accounting for ﬁ  nancial securities, albeit with new circuit breakers to 
mitigate problems that can arise when markets are illiquid. International 
accounting standards, slated to be adopted in the United States, also ﬁ  rmly 
embrace fair value principles. Most notably, federal budget agencies have 
recently emphasized fair value estimates for the cost of new obligations aris-
ing from the ﬁ  nancial crisis, precisely because not adjusting for market risk 
produces less credible cost estimates.1
These basic themes are further elaborated on in chapter 3, “The Cost 
of Risk to the Government and Its Implications for Federal Budgeting,” 
by Deborah Lucas and Marvin Phaup. The authors lay out the economic 
case for incorporating the cost of market risk in government decision mak-
ing, describe how risky securities are currently accounted for in the federal 
budget and how this likely biases real resource allocations, and survey the 
results of recent research on the cost of market risk for federal obligations.
The analysis begins by addressing both the philosophical and practical 
impediments to incorporating the cost of risk into federal budget estimates. 
As noted previously, while the idea that market risk is a legitimate cost is now 
widely accepted in the private sector and by most academic economists, the 
concept has not gained such wide acceptance among policymakers nor in 
the federal budgeting community. The authors revisit the lively debate that 
took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s between the leading economists 
of the time over whether the risk of activities undertaken by the government 
should be treated as a cost. They suggest that more recent developments in 
ﬁ  nancial economics support the idea, which also had considerable currency 
in the early debate, that systematic or market risk represents a legitimate 
cost to taxpayers and that this cost is best measured by market prices. Fur-
ther, they make the case that the logic supporting the use of market prices 
1. For instance, the legislation that authorized the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) 
explicitly overrode the standard Federal Credit Reform Act (FCRA) practice of using the risk-
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is largely robust to considerations of various market frictions and market 
incompleteness.
The use of market prices is also justiﬁ  ed on consistency grounds. In fact, 
the vast majority of expenditures are recorded in the budget at market prices. 
Cash transfers arising from Social Security beneﬁ  ts, food stamps, and so 
forth are accounted for at a market price; by deﬁ  nition—the real value of a 
dollar is what one gets by spending it on a consumption bundle. Federal pur-
chases from the private sector for military hardware, the labor of the federal 
workforce, buildings, computers, electricity, and so on are all expenditures 
that occur at market prices. While the Federal Government caps certain 
expenditures such as Medicare reimbursements to doctors, nevertheless, the 
transactions occur at market prices. Thus, using market prices puts ﬁ  nancial 
obligations on a consistent basis with other forms of federal spending.
Also important is that the practical alternatives to market prices—report-
ing historical cost or discounting expected cash ﬂ  ows at risk- free rates—are 
subject to the same criticisms. These alternatives also rely on market prices: 
risk-  free rates are derived from the market prices of US Treasury securi-
ties, and historical book values are stale market prices. Hence, if one can-
not trust markets to determine value, the leading alternatives are equally 
problematic.
The rules for accounting for federal ﬁ  nancial obligations are complicated. 
Various categories of obligations are accounted for very diﬀerently, and 
distinct biases arise in each instance. Credit is accounted for on an accrual 
basis, whereas insurance and investments are on a cash basis. Accrual costs 
for credit exclude the market price of risk and also certain administrative 
costs. This tends to understate the full cost of credit and creates a bias toward 
using risky loans or loan guarantees in preference to direct grants and other 
forms of assistance for which cost is measured more comprehensively and at 
market prices. For investments in publicly traded securities (e.g., equities), 
a diﬀerent sort of distortion arises from the use of cash basis accounting. 
Securities purchased at market prices entail no net transfer of resources from 
the government, but under cash basis accounting, such transactions appear 
costly, because the large initial outlays are not oﬀset by expected dividends 
or interest payments in the budget window.
To illustrate the practical importance of these eﬀects, the authors survey 
the existing studies estimating the size of the distortions caused by omitting 
the cost of risk in speciﬁ  c federal activities. The results suggest that the size 
of the omissions in many cases is sizeable; for instance, the estimate by the 
Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) in 2005 of the present value of shortfalls 
for the Pension Beneﬁ  t Guarantee Corporation increases from $32 billion 
to $63 billion when market risk is taken into account.
Catastrophic risks such as terrorism, hurricanes, earthquakes, and ﬂ  oods 
are often explicitly or implicitly insured by the Federal Government. These 
events, which regularly trigger billions of dollars in emergency spending, Introduction    5
nevertheless are treated as surprises every year that require supplemental 
appropriations outside of the normal budget process. In chapter 4, “Fed-
eral Financial Exposure to Natural Catastrophe Risk,” David Cummins, 
Michael Suher, and George Zanjani draw on a wide variety of government 
and private-  sector data sources to document the size and causes of these 
expenditures from 1989 to 2008. Their analysis suggests that these expenses, 
which have been escalating rapidly, are to a large extent predictable and 
therefore could be better accounted for and controlled. They also make a 
persuasive case for the likely continuing high rate of federal spending growth 
for catastrophes.
One reason for the steady and protracted cost growth is the increasing 
value of infrastructure exposed to catastrophe. Disaster relief expenditures 
have been the most signiﬁ  cant component of federal catastrophe exposure. 
Another driver of cost growth is the political process. While some of these 
obligations are explicit in the law—for instance, the Staﬀord Emergency 
Assistance and Relief Act of 1988 requires federal aid when state and local 
resources are overwhelmed by a major catastrophe—much of the assis-
tance that is provided is “discretionary.” However, the authors argue that 
the strong expectation of public assistance, combined with the ad hoc way in 
which the decision to grant aid is made in the legislative process, eﬀectively 
means these expenditures are mandatory.
Projections of future average expenses and their probability distribution 
are developed using two approaches: a commercial catastrophe model and 
historical catastrophe loss data. Under conservative assumptions, assistance 
related to hurricanes, earthquakes, thunderstorms, and winter storms is pro-
jected to be about $20 billion in a normal year and could exceed $100 billion 
in a bad year. The $20 billion far exceeds the regular appropriations for the 
Disaster Relief Fund, which averaged only about $1 billion over the period 
from 2001 to 2005. Capitalizing the expected expenditures over the next 
seventy- ﬁ  ve years, the liability to the Federal Government is estimated to 
be comparable in magnitude to the shortfall projected for Social Security 
over the same horizon.
To further the goal of increasing homeownership, federal housing policy 
makes extensive use of credit and tax incentives. As recent events have under-
scored, these activities involve substantial federal cost and risk. Chapter 5, 
“Housing Policy, Mortgage Policy, and the Federal Housing Administra-
tion,” by Dwight Jaﬀee and John Quigley, reviews these programs and esti-
mates the value of indirect and oﬀ- budget activities supporting homeowner-
ship. The analysis emphasizes the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) 
mortgage insurance programs and revisits their rationale and future role in 
light of the rapid rise and subsequent fall of the subprime market.
Federal housing policy is executed through a complex array of institutions 
and programs, including the tax code, the Federal Housing Administration, 
the Veterans Administration (VA), and government sponsored enterprises 6    Deborah  Lucas
such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. A 
comprehensive look at these programs reveals that oﬀ-  budget policies pri-
marily provide subsidies for middle-   and upper-  income homeowners and 
home purchasers, whereas programs subject to Congressional budget appro-
priations are directed toward lower-  income and rental households.
Jaﬀee and Quigley calculate that tax expenditures—relative to a baseline 
of the tax treatment of commercial real estate—represent by far the most 
expensive subsidies to housing. Speciﬁ  cally, housing services are treated 
asymmetrically to rental housing, and the ﬁ  rst $0.5 million of realized capi-
tal gains is tax exempt. Depreciation, maintenance, and repairs, however, 
are not deductable. The net eﬀect for 2007 is estimated to be $32.5 billion 
in foregone revenue from imputed rental income less expenses. The mort-
gage payment deduction adds another $78.1 billion in tax expenditures. The 
property tax exclusion represents $15 billion of cost, and the capital gains 
exemption represents $43 billion. Overall, tax expenditures in 2007 were 
about $166 billion, or about seven times the tax expenditures for all other 
housing programs. The value of subsidies related to the GSEs is harder to 
evaluate, as is their incidence. Surveying the literature that estimates the GSE 
subsidy, they suggest that the annual cost is on order of $10 billion.
The much less costly programs serving the low-  income market have 
evolved from the ﬁ  rst Public Housing Act of 1937, which ﬁ  nanced construc-
tion aimed at the “elimination of substandard and other inadequate hous-
ing,” to the current emphasis on Section 8 housing vouchers that provide 
rent subsidies to about 1.9 million households to obtain privately provided 
housing, at a reported cost of $37.7 billion in 2007.
The FHA and VA insurance and guarantee programs had their origins in 
the Great Depression. Mortgages at the time were short term, had low loan-
  to-  value ratios, and required a balloon payment at maturity. The crisis left 
most borrowers unable to reﬁ  nance and caused others to default, leading to 
the bankruptcy of many lending institutions. In 1934, Congress established 
the FHA to oversee a program of home mortgage insurance, predicated on 
“economically sound” self-  amortizing, long-  term mortgages. This led to 
standardization of mortgage products and underwriting procedures nation-
ally. In its early years, the program served the vast majority of homeowners 
and involved little redistribution. The VA loan program came into existence 
near the end of World War II and grew to be a more highly subsidized ben-
eﬁ  t, providing a federal guarantee for up to 60 percent of mortgages made 
to eligible veterans. Over time, the FHA program evolved toward provid-
ing guarantees to low-  income borrowers attracted by low down payment 
requirements and less stringent credit requirements.
The two programs reached their peak volume in 2003, with $165 billion 
and $66 billion of mortgages insured by the FHA and VA, respectively. By 
2006, the volume had declined to $54 billion for the FHA and less than $25 
billion for the VA in insured mortgages. The decline in the importance of Introduction    7
these programs in terms of the share of total mortgages outstanding was 
more dramatic and began in the 1960s. Quigley and Jaﬀee show that what 
took their place was the (re)development of private mortgage insurance and 
the concurrent expansion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. At the same 
time, FHA and VA growth was impeded by ﬁ  xed nominal limits on the 
loans insured, and in recent years, by competition from the rapid growth of 
subprime lending. The higher credit quality end of FHA lending has also 
been increasingly captured by Fannie and Freddie, which have expanded 
into these riskier products. The authors argue that the fundamental reasons 
behind these dramatic changes include improved credit scoring models in 
the private sector and a philosophical shift and lack of contract innovation 
on the part of the FHA. The recently heightened concern about predatory 
lending suggests a new role for the FHA in setting standards for nonpreda-
tory practices and perhaps in oﬀering a higher-  quality product to compete 
with private oﬀerings.
In chapter 6, “Valuing Government Guarantees: Fannie and Freddie 
Revisited,” Deborah Lucas and Robert McDonald consider some of the 
methodological issues surrounding estimating GSE subsidy values using a 
derivatives pricing approach and provide new estimates of the subsidy to 
Fannie and Freddie, taking these considerations into account. Existing esti-
mates of the GSE subsidy value—made under the relatively stable market 
conditions of the last decade—vary enormously, ranging from $200 million 
to $182 billion. The wide range reduces the credibility of cost estimates 
and suggests the need to reconsider what is driving these diﬀerences. The 
takeover of Fannie and Freddie by the Federal Government and the pros-
pect that they may remain fully federal entities for an extended time period 
underscore the need for improved tools to evaluate and monitor their costs 
and risks.
Past estimates of the GSE subsidy value are based on two broad 
approaches: spread based and derivatives based. The former focuses on the 
interest rate diﬀerential, or spread, between the borrowing rates for the GSEs 
versus similarly risky but unguaranteed ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms, whereas the latter 
relies on the observation that a default guarantee is equivalent to a put 
option on the assets of the ﬁ  rm and hence can be valued using derivative 
pricing techniques. In general, spread-  based analyses produce much larger 
estimates of subsidy value. One reason for the discrepancies is that the two 
approaches answer slightly diﬀerent questions. The derivatives approach 
looks only at the cost of providing insurance against default, whereas the 
interest rate spread also takes into account other advantages the GSEs may 
have in terms of liquidity or regulatory preference that lower their cost of 
capital. The analysis highlights a further reason that spreads may overesti-
mate the cost to the government: at times, insured ﬁ  rms have an incentive 
to avoid default to preserve future guarantee value, making them less likely 
to default than an otherwise similar uninsured ﬁ  rm.8    Deborah  Lucas
To rigorously explore the question of whether and how the presence of a 
repeated government guarantee changes the relation between a ﬁ  rm’s equity 
value and the value of its operating assets, the authors develop a theoreti-
cal valuation model. Understanding this relation is important, because in 
derivative-  based approaches to valuing debt guarantees, the unobservable 
value and volatility of assets is inferred from the observable value and vola-
tility of equity. If the presence of the guarantee changes these relations—for 
instance, by aﬀecting equity dynamics—the inferences could be biased.
In the model, it is assumed that an insured ﬁ  rm can continue indeﬁ  nitely 
to issue insured debt in an amount based on the value of its operating (i.e., 
nonguarantee) assets, as long as it comes up with suﬃcient cash to cover 
its obligations at each debt maturity date. It will do so as long as staying in 
business is better for equity holders than declaring bankruptcy. The theo-
retical analysis reveals that in fact, the presence of the guarantee does not 
fundamentally change the relation between the volatility of levered equity 
and the underlying assets, leaving intact the standard equations underlying 
derivatives- based pricing. It does, however, create a wedge between the value 
of operating assets and the market value of debt and equity equal to the 
present value of the future stream of income generated by the guarantee. 
This aﬀects the initial conditions for derivatives-  based estimates. The anal-
ysis also reveals that the spread- based approach is upwardly biased when no 
correction is made for the lower-  predicted default rate for guaranteed ﬁ  rms 
that optimally default less often to preserve the value of future guarantees.
To provide estimates that take into account these considerations and 
that also incorporate potentially important complications such as jumps in 
underlying asset value, time- varying asset volatility, and a more complicated 
default policy, Lucas and McDonald calibrate and simulate a computational 
version of the model. They ﬁ  nd that an insurance premium of 20 to 30 basis 
points on Fannie and Freddie debt would have been fair compensation for 
the default risk assumed by the government under the benign economic 
conditions of 2005. However, an asset value decline of 10 percent causes the 
fair premium to more than double, highlighting the sensitivity of guarantee 
values to changes in equity value in highly levered ﬁ  nancial institutions, and 
also demonstrating the usefulness of these types of models in setting risk-
  based insurance premiums.
The Federal Government can support credit to target groups either 
through direct lending or by guaranteeing against default risk loans made 
by private ﬁ  nancial institutions. Whereas most federal credit programs rely 
on either direct lending or on loan guarantees exclusively, the federal stu-
dent loan program is unique in maintaining two large and competing pro-
grams to support higher education, one of each type—the Federal Family 
Educational Loan Program (guaranteed program) and the Federal Direct 
Loan Program (direct program). This structure provides the opportunity to 
compare the cost to the government of these diﬀerent ﬁ  nancing and delivery Introduction    9
mechanisms for very similar underlying loan products. Since both programs 
are accounted for in the federal budget, the costs as estimated under cur-
rent budgeting rules also can be compared to market value- based estimates. 
In chapter 7, “Guaranteed versus Direct Lending: The Case of Student 
Loans,” Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore develop a quantitative valua-
tion model for student loans under the rules of each program and use it to 
explore these issues.
After adjusting for the market cost of capital, asymmetric treatment of 
administrative costs, and other inconsistencies in how the programs are bud-
geted for, the authors ﬁ  nd that the guaranteed program appears to be fun-
damentally more expensive than the direct program, with an 11 percentage 
point higher subsidy rate (i.e., costing $0.11 more in present value per dollar 
of loans originated). The diﬀerential can be attributed primarily to admin-
istrative costs associated with the structure of the guaranteed program and 
to the fact that guaranteed lenders are paid more than is required to induce 
them to lend at statutory terms. The direct program also appears to have a 
real cost advantage. As well as lower administrative costs, the direct program 
has the apparent advantage of raising funds via the Treasury rather than 
through private ﬁ  nancial institutions.
In light of its cost disadvantage, a natural question is whether the guar-
anteed program provides oﬀsetting beneﬁ  ts. In general, which method is a 
more eﬃcient way to provide credit assistance depends on a variety of fac-
tors including the relative cost of capital, administrative eﬃciency, and the 
incentives to screen and monitor borrowers. Lucas and Moore point out 
that because student loans have categorical entitlement and an almost full 
credit guarantee, the value added by private intermediation is less obvious 
than for some other programs.
The discrepancy between budget estimates and market value estimates of 
subsidy rates on student loans is found to be large. Including a credit risk 
premium in subsidy rate estimates increases the subsidy rate by more than 
15 percentage points. As a consequence, the budget cost of student loans 
signiﬁ  cantly understates the cost to taxpayers. The authors also suggest that 
the cost understatement can distort policy choices in a way that has real 
eﬀects—for instance, favoring an increase in the student loan program over 
other forms of assistance to students like direct grants, which have been 
shown to be more eﬀective for encouraging low-  income students to obtain 
a higher education.
The last two chapters in this volume show how the principles of ﬁ  nancial 
economics can be fruitfully extended to analyze federal ﬁ  nancial exposures 
that go beyond the realm of traditional ﬁ  nancial activities. In chapter 8, 
“Market Valuation of Accrued Social Security Beneﬁ  ts,” John Geanakop-
los and Stephen Zeldes apply the principles of market valuation to Social 
Security obligations. The calculations are relevant: to assessing the size of 
unfunded federal liabilities, to the debate over whether and how they should 10    Deborah  Lucas
be accounted for in the ﬁ  nancial statements of the US government, to help-
ing workers plan for retirement, for plans to privatize beneﬁ  ts based on the 
fair value of current accruals, and for considering asset allocation in the 
trust fund. Interestingly, this is a case where taking market risk into account 
has the eﬀect of lowering the estimated cost of federal obligations relative 
to traditional cost estimates.
Most existing analyses project Social Security obligations forward, taking 
into account demographic and wage trends. They implicitly treat the pro-
jected obligations as riskless by discounting them at a riskless rate. In fact, 
promised beneﬁ  ts are correlated with long-  run wages through the beneﬁ  ts 
formula, which bases lifetime annuity payments on a worker’s average real 
wage over his or her thirty- ﬁ  ve highest- earning years. This means that when 
the economy has done well, promised beneﬁ  ts are higher, and conversely 
when economic growth is low. Hence, there is systematic risk associated with 
Social Security obligations.
The valuation approach taken by Geanakoplos and Zeldes is to treat 
Social Security claims as derivatives of the stock market. Although the 
empirical correlation between wages and stock returns is low over short 
horizons, in the long-  run, evidence suggests that the two are positively cor-
related. A risk-  neutral Monte Carlo model, calibrated with historical data 
on stock returns, labor earnings, the risk-  free rate, demographic data, and 
the rules governing Social Security obligations, yields an estimated market 
value for claims held by workers of diﬀerent current ages. Aggregating across 
birth cohorts yields an estimate of aggregate liabilities. Adjusting for mar-
ket risk has a signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on estimates of the present value of accrued 
beneﬁ  ts, particularly for beneﬁ  ts accrued for workers not yet retired. For 
workers under age sixty, the present value of costs, measured as the present 
value of accrued beneﬁ  ts less the current value in the trust fund, falls from 
$8.57 trillion to $6.05 trillion when the discount rate is risk adjusted. For 
retirees, the eﬀect of market risk is minimal, since promised beneﬁ  ts are not 
aﬀected by future shocks to the aggregate economy. Overall, taking market 
risk into account decreases the present value of beneﬁ  ts to 81 percent of the 
estimated value calculated using a riskless discount rate.
Failure at the federal level to account for the value of environmental assets 
and liabilities and to actively manage the associated risks has potentially 
dire consequences. In chapter 9, “Environment and Energy: Catastrophic 
Liabilities,” Geoﬀrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther review the extent to 
which the government faces liabilities arising from its management of envi-
ronmental risks and also survey estimates of the size of natural capital as 
an asset. They then look in detail at the Price-  Anderson Nuclear Industries 
Indemnity Act (P- A Act) in order to assess the nature of this federal liability 
and to suggest ways in which it could be more eﬀectively managed.
Valuing environmental assets and liabilities has been an active area of 
environmental research in the last decade, but it is a complicated undertaking Introduction    1 1
that is made especially diﬃcult by the absence of markets for many of these 
resources. An example given of undervaluation due to underpriced positive 
externalities is the New York City watershed, which provides uncompen-
sated value in the form of clean water and the avoidance of ﬁ  ltration costs. 
Another is the cost of the gradual destruction of barrier islands in the Gulf 
of Mexico that partially protect New Orleans from costly storm surges. Simi-
larly to ﬁ  nancial transactions, the authors note that government accounting 
standards tend to be less stringent than those imposed in the private sector, 
potentially encouraging natural resource depletion. For example, mineral 
depletion under US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) must 
be recorded as a reduction in assets on corporate balance sheets. Under the 
United Nations System of National Accounts, however, depletion is not 
treated as a charge against national income. Data from the World Bank 
gives some sense of the aggregate importance of environmental assets. It 
shows natural capital as accounting for 26 percent of total public and private 
capital for low- income countries but only 2 percent for high- income Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. 
Even the 2 percent is a large absolute number, since many forms of natural 
capital are omitted, and the total size of the capital stock is large.
Nuclear power plants have a highly skewed risk proﬁ  le, with a high prob-
ability of emitting no pollutants, and a very small chance of a catastrophic 
meltdown, as in the case of the Chernobyl reactor. The disposal of nuclear 
waste also entails the potential for catastrophes. Whether these risks have 
become more or less severe over time is hard to measure. The frequency of 
accidents in the United States has decreased markedly from the 1960s and 
1970s, but reactors are located close to population centers that have grown 
larger over time, and the potential size of losses is enormous. For instance, 
it is estimated that the cost of a major meltdown of the Indian Point reactor 
located near New York City could top $1 trillion. The historical justiﬁ  ca-
tion for the P-  A Act, which was renewed in 2005, is that such exposures 
make it impossible for the nuclear industry to obtain private insurance. The 
authors review the conditions normally thought to be necessary for private 
insurability and conclude that the risks are in fact unique, massive, and not 
well understood, probably making it impossible to have a nuclear industry 
that relies on completely private insurance. They go on to look into the 
details of the P-  A Act to see whether it is likely to meet goals such as miti-
gating moral hazard in how plants are operated and where they are sited. 
The conclusion is that problems such as regulatory capture by the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and inadequate incentives for investing in 
safety suggest that the rules could be improved and that improvements in 
other catastrophe insurance programs provide some models that could be 
adopted in the nuclear context.
These chapters were ﬁ  rst presented and discussed at an eponymous con-
ference sponsored by the Zell Center for Risk Research at Kellogg and held 12    Deborah  Lucas
at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University in Febru-
ary 2007. The conference brought together scholars and policymakers from 
academia, research institutions, and the government. This volume includes 
two of the presentations made by policymakers that crystallize the central 
issues: a keynote address by Peter Fisher, former under secretary of Treasury 
and now a managing director at Blackrock, on the importance of bringing 
ﬁ  nancial literacy to Washington; and a talk by Donald Marron, former 
acting director of the Congressional Budget Oﬃce, on how cost estimates 
are used in Congressional decision making and how risk might be usefully 
incorporated. It is my hope that the chapters and discussions in this volume 
will provide further impetus for work in this area that ultimately leads to 
better informed decision making in the public sector.